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I. INTRODUCTION 
 Coal has been described as “the dirtiest fossil fuel on the planet.”1 
And the Pacific Northwest is facing a glut of it. For the first time in over 
twenty years, coal companies are pushing to expand their west-coast 
exports with new marine export terminals. Two of the proposed 
terminals — the 12,000-acre Gateway Pacific Terminal in Whatcom 
County and the 416-acre Millennium Bulk Terminal in Cowlitz County 
— are slotted for Washington. Combined, these two coal terminals 
would cost more than a billion dollars to construct;2 they would export 
nearly 100 million metric tons of coal per year, destined for Asian power 
plants;3 and they would result in substantially increased vessel and rail 
traffic.4 Not surprisingly, the two proposals have drawn the ire of many 
                                                 
1. Aaron Corvin, Port Dodges Coal, Embraces Potash, COLUMBIAN (Apr. 3, 2011), available 
at http://www.columbian.com/news/2011/apr/03/dodging-coal-embracing-potash-the-port-of 
-vancouve/.  
2. See Project Information Document: Gateway Pacific Terminal, PACIFIC INT’L TERMINALS, 
INC. 1-6 (February 28, 2011), available at http://www.co.whatcom.wa.us/pds/plan/current/gpt-
ssa/pdf/2011-02-28-project-info-doc.pdf; see also Economic & Fiscal Impact Assessment of 
Millennium Bulk Terminals (Apr. 12, 2012), available at http://millenniumbulk.com/wp-
content/uploads/2012/04/Economic_Study-Executive_Summary.pdf. 
3. See Gateway Pacific Terminal at Cherry Point Proposal, WASH. DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, 
http://www.ecy.wa.gov/geographic/gatewaypacific (last visited June 9, 2014) (reporting that the 
Gateway pacific Terminal is projected to export up to 54 million metric tons of coal per year); 
Millennium Bulk Terminals Longview (MBTL) Proposal, WASH. DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, 
http://www.ecy.wa.gov/geographic/millennium/ (last visited June 9, 2014).  
4.  The Gateway Pacific Terminal alone is expected to increase local vessel traffic by 487 
round-trips per year between Whatcom County and Asian coastal energy markets. See PACIFIC INT’L 
TERMINALS, supra note 2, at 4-54. The Gateway Pacific Terminal is also expected to receive 
approximately nine train-loads of coal per day (or approximately 3,285 trainloads per year). Id. at 4-
51. According to the BNSF Railway Company, these coal trains lose between 250 and 700 pounds of 
coal dust per trip, which can foul local waters and potentially lead to health problems for 
communities along the rail line. See In re. Ark. Elec. Coop. Corp.- Petition for Declaratory Order: 
Public Hearing Before the U.S. Surface Transp. Bd. 39-49 (July 29, 2011) (Testimony of Gregory 
Fox, BNSF Vice President of Transportation) available at http://www.stb.dot.gov/TransAnd 
Statements.nsf/8740c718e33d774e85256dd500572ae5/9e49ebf2fea431f1852578460066c5cb/$FILE/
0729stb-exh.pdf. The impacts of “coal dust” spilling off these trains, and into waterways throughout 
the state of Washington, are currently the subject of two citizen suits under the federal Clean Water 
Act. See Sierra Club, et al.  v. BNSF Railway Company, No. 2:13-cv-00967-JCC (W.D. Wash. filed 
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Washington citizens and environmental groups. Environmental review of 
the two projects under Washington’s State Environmental Policy Act 
(“SEPA”)5 has generated more than 300,000 public comments.6 It is safe 
to say that the proposed coal terminals, if constructed, would be the 
largest coal export facilities ever seen on the west coast (and likely the 
most controversial, too). Indeed, the Gateway Pacific Terminal would be 
the largest coal export facility ever built in North America,7 and it alone 
would boost “America’s total export of coal by some 40 percent.”8 In 
light of the dramatic impacts on climate change that might result from 
burning that much more coal, Washington Governor Jay Inslee has 
described approval of these coal terminals as “the largest decision we 
will be making as a state from a carbon pollution standpoint.”9 
 To date, large west coast coal terminals have been a bust, with other 
facilities in Portland, Oregon, and Los Angeles failing in the 1980s and 
1990s.10 Several Washington ports (including the Port of Vancouver, the 
Port of Tacoma, and the Port of Kalama) have rejected similar proposals 
                                                                                                             
June 4, 2013); Sierra Club et al. v. BNSF Railway Company, No. 2:13-cv-00272-LRS (E.D. Wash. 
filed July 24, 2013).  
5. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C. 
6. Scoping Report, GATEWAY PACIFIC TERMINAL EIS (2012)  
http://www.eisgatewaypacificwa.gov/resources/scoping-report (reporting that the public scoping 
period for the Gateway Pacific Terminal generated approximately 125,000 public comments at in-
person scoping meetings, online, and in writing); see also WASH. DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, supra note 3 
(reporting that the public scoping period for the Millennium Bulk Terminal generated more than 
215,000 comments from the public). While these numbers are already impressive, the outpouring of 
public comments on the two proposals is likely to grow significantly in the future. As discussed 
below, the projects have yet to receive their most intensive environmental review by federal, state, 
and local agencies. 
7. See, e.g., Key Facts, COAL TRAIN FACTS, www.coaltrainfacts.org/key-facts (last visited June 
9, 2014); see also Eric de Place & Pam Mac Rae, Coal Exports from Canada: Why Coal Planned for 
Ports in Oregon and Washington Cannot Divert to British Columbia (July 2012), 
http://www.sightline.org/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2012/07/canada-coal_2012.pdf. 
8. Letter from Maia Bellon, Dir. of the Wash. Dep’t. of Ecology, to Hon. Doug Ericksen, State 
Senate, 42nd Legislative Dist. (Aug. 22, 2013), available at  http://washingtonports.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/11/Annual13-CLE-EcologyLetterGatewayReview.pdf. 
9. Jessica Goad, Governor Inslee Calls Coal Exports ‘The Largest Decision We Will Be 
Making As A State From A Carbon Pollution Standpoint,’ Climate Progress, THINKPROGRESS (Jan. 
22, 2013, 2:56 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2013/01/22/1480481/governor-inslee-on-coal-
exports-this-is-the-largest-decision-we-will-be-making-as-a-state-from-a-carbon-pollution-
standpoint/. 
10. See Brett VandenHeuvel & Eric de Place, Coal Export: A history of Failure for Western 
Ports (Aug. 2011), http://columbiariverkeeper.org/our-work/coal-export/coal-export-a-history-of-
failure/ (detailing the 1980’s failure of the Pacific Coal Terminal in Portland, Oregon, and the 1990’s 
failure of the LAXT terminal in Los Angeles). See also Eric de Place, Northwest Coal Exports: Some 
Common Questions about Economics, Health, and Pollution 7-8 (April 2012), 
http://treatyprotection.org/documentation/coal-FAQ-April12.pdf. 
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due to coal’s risky market status.11 Market analysts have warned that 
Asian coal markets may not be the boon that many in the coal industry 
believe them to be.12 Indeed, one big-money backer (Goldman Sachs) 
recently backed out of the Gateway Pacific Terminal project altogether, 
leaving many to wonder if Wall Street still considers the project viable.13 
 Nevertheless, proponents of the new coal terminals are pushing on. 
In 2012, controversy over the Gateway Pacific Terminal turned a small 
Whatcom County election into national news.14 With four seats up for 
grabs on the seven-member Whatcom County Council (a body with 
significant review authority over the Gateway Pacific Terminal, 
including the authority to disapprove it) pro-coal interests flooded the 
election with campaign donations.15 Groups opposed to the project 
pushed back16 and, “Big Coal” money notwithstanding, candidates 
perceived to be opposed to the terminal swept the local election. Further, 
while the new Council members refused to talk about the terminal during 
the campaign, and for good reason,17 it is widely believed that a majority 
of the Council are willing to consider with an open mind criticisms that 
the proposal does not meet legal requirements. The public perception is 
                                                 
11. See VandenHeuvel & de Place, supra note 10; see also de Place, supra note 10. 
12. See Coal Age News, Building a Coal Terminal on the West Coast, COAL AGE (December 
18, 2010), http://www.coalage.com/index.php/features/763; Clark Williams-Derry, The Coal Export 
Bubble, SIGHTLINE DAILY (Aug. 6, 2013, 9:30 AM), http://daily.sightline.org/2013/08/06/the-coal-
export-bubble/ (detailing recent declines in Pacific Rim coal prices; but see Steven Globerman, Coal 
Exports from the Pacific Northwest and the Economic Growth of the Northwest Economy (June 
2013), available at  http://www.wsfb.com/system/files/Globerman,+WAFB+Export+Paper.pdf. 
13. See, e.g., Eric de Place, Is the Smart Money Bailing on Northwest Coal Exports?, 
SIGHTLINE DAILY (Jan. 8, 2014, 7:00 AM), available at http://daily.sightline.org/2014/01/08/is-the-
smart-money-bailing-on-northwest-coal-exports/.  
14. See, e.g., Carol Davenport, The Obscure County Election that Could Change the Planet, 
NAT’L J. (May 23, 2013), http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/the-obscure-county-election-
that-could-change-the-planet-20130523. 
15. See Eric de Place, Coal Money in Politics: Whatcom County, SIGHTLINE DAILY (Oct. 21, 
2013, 12:41 PM), http://daily.sightline.org/2013/10/21/coal-money-in-politics-whatcom-county/; see 
also Ralph Schwartz, Coal Terminal, Outside Money at Issue in Whatcom County Council Races, 
BELLINGHAM HERALD (Oct. 24, 2013),   http://www.bellinghamherald.com/2013/10/24/3274914/ 
coal-terminal-outside-money-at.html. 
16. See de Place, supra note 15; Schwarts, supra note 15.  
17. See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.36.040. See also Timothy Lange, Winners of Whatcom County, 
Washington, Council Races Could Nix Proposed Coal-Exporting Terminal, DAILY KOS (November 
6, 2013, 9:05 AM) http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/11/06/1253557/-Winners-of- 
WhatcomCounty-Washington-council-races-could-nix-proposed-coal-exporting-terminal (reporting 
that “neither the pro-conservation no pro-development candidates in the race mentioned the coal 
terminal in their campaigns because of their quasi-judicial decision in the matter requires . . . the 
‘appearance of impartiality’”). 
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that when the Council reviews the project under its local zoning and 
development codes, it will have wide leeway to reject it.18  
 Proponents of Pacific Northwest coal terminals are now raising the 
specter of turning the local review process into a federal case. In 2013, 
proponents of the Gateway Pacific Terminal were dismayed to learn that 
the Washington Department of Ecology would be reviewing the project 
not only for its direct impacts on local resources, but also for its 
contribution to climate change (caused by the burning of coal in Asian 
power plants) and other region-wide impacts.19 Determined to ensure that 
the Millennium Bulk Terminal would not face the same fate (and 
providing a preview of things to come in Whatcom County), the 
Attorneys General for Montana and North Dakota warned Cowlitz 
County that reviewing the project on such grounds is unconstitutional.20 
They also argued that “any” decision to deny the project would violate 
the Federal Constitution’s Commerce Clause because impacts of the 
decision would fall predominately (or even entirely) on private 
businesses and states outside Washington’s borders,21 and because (in all 
likelihood) a decision to deny the project would focus on impacts 
specific to coal, which would also allegedly violate the Commerce 
Clause.22  
 Similar arguments based on the dormant Commerce Clause have 
been cited elsewhere (with varying degrees of success) in challenges 
                                                 
18. See Joel Connelly, Bad News for  Big Coal in Whatcom County, SEATTLE P.I. (November 
5, 2013), available at  http://blog.seattlepi.com/seattlepolitics/2013/11/05/bad-news-for-big-coal-in- 
whatcom-county/. 
19. See Press Release, Joint Release: Whatcom County, Washington State Department of 
Ecology, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Agencies Set Scope of Environmental Impact Statement 
for Proposed Cherry Point Export Project (July 31, 2013), available at  
http://www.ecy.wa.gov/news/2013/197.html. See also FAQ on Scope of EIS Studies for Gateway 
Pacific Terminal (GPT), EISGATEWAYPACIFICWA.GOV (July 31, 2013), available at 
http://www.eisgatewaypacificwa.gov/sites/default/files/content/files/GPT-%20FAQ%20-7-30-
13%20Final_0_1.pdf#overlay-context=resources/project-library. 
20. See Letter from Rob McKenna, Partner, Orrick, Herrinton & Sutclifffe LLP, to Millennium 
Bulk Terminals-Longview EIS, Dep’t of Ecology-Southwest Regional Office, U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers, Cowliz Cnty., & George Raiter, Special Projects Manager (Nov. 18, 2013), available at 
http://www.millenniumbulkeiswa.gov/comments/MBTL-EIS-0002299-58927.pdf. Montana and 
North Dakota are two of the states hoping to capitalize on the Gateway Pacific Terminal (along with 
Wyoming, which hopes to export substantial amounts of coal from the Powder River Basin, the most 
productive coal land in the country). 
21. See id. at 5. Washington has few coal reserves, and denial of the project will largely impact 
other states (like Montana, North Dakota, and Wyoming) that produce the coal to be exported at the 
Gateway Pacific Terminal.  
22. Id.  
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involving natural gas drilling bans,23 railroads,24 liquefied natural gas 
(“LNG”) export facilities,25 and, not surprisingly, coal export terminals 
on the East Coast of the United States.26 The new Whatcom County 
Council might view these arguments as a shot across the bow — a threat 
that any serious scrutiny of the terminal will provoke a challenge of 
constitutional proportions. As a result, it is possible that the Council 
might take a light hand to its environmental review for fear of embroiling 
itself in a bigger fight.  
 Accordingly, this article examines the potential constitutional law 
issues involved in local review of the proposed coal terminals. It explores 
these issues in the specific context of Whatcom County’s review of the 
Gateway Pacific Terminal. Part II provides a brief overview of the 
history of the Gateway Pacific terminal. Part III explores issues 
associated with the facility under the dormant Commerce Clause. 
Finally, this article concludes that there are few serious issues associated 
with Whatcom County’s review of the proposal that would violate the 
dormant Commerce Clause. Moreover, Whatcom County will have a 
great deal of authority to approve or deny the Gateway Pacific Terminal, 
and it faces few threats of violating the dormant Commerce Clause. 
While proponents of the new coal terminal appear to be gearing up for a 
fight of constitutional proportions, their bark is likely worse than their 
bite.  
II. HISTORY OF THE GATEWAY PACIFIC TERMINAL 
A. The Original Proposal 
 On December 24, 1991, a joint venture known as Pacific 
International Terminals (also known as “PIT”) applied to the United 
States Army Corps of Engineers to construct a bulk materials export 
                                                 
23. See Kenneth S. Kamlet, Shale Gas Perspectives — When do Gas Drilling Bans Violate the 
Constitution of the United States, HINMAN, HOWARD & KATTELL LLP (Oct. 9, 2013), 
http://blog.hhk.com/?p=370. 
24. See Dakota, Minnesota & Eastern Railroad Corp. v. South Dakota, 236 F. Supp. 2d 989 
(S.D.S.D. 2002) (striking down state law requiring railroad to file separate proceeding to condemn 
each parcel along a trans-state rail corridor), affirmed in part, rev’d in part, and modified on other 
grounds at 362 F.3d 512 (8th Cir. 2004).  
25. See AES Sparrows Point LNG, LLC v. Smith, 539 F. Supp. 2d 788 (D. Md. 2007) 
(upholding state law prohibiting LNG export facility), rev’d on other grounds at 527 F.2d 120 (4th 
Cir. 2008), cert denied at 129 S. Ct. 310 (2008). 
26. See Norfolk Southern Corp. v. Oberly, 822 F.2d 388 (3rd Cir. 1987) (upholding Delaware 
law prohibiting marine coal “transfer” facilities in Delaware Bay).  
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facility in Whatcom County, Washington.27 The joint venture, formed in 
1990, was a partnership between a subsidiary of the Stevedoring Services 
of America (now called “SSA Marine”) and Westshore Terminals, Ltd.28 
SSA Marine is the West Coast’s largest stevedoring company and 
Westshore Terminals currently operates the largest coal export facility in 
North America, which is located in Vancouver, British Columbia.29 The 
Army Corps permit application (needed to construct the multi-berth pier 
and approach trestle serving the terminal) was soon followed by 
applications to obtain authorization for the facility under Washington’s 
Shoreline Management Act30 and to obtain a Major Development permit 
from Whatcom County.31  
 The original terminal proposal, described generically by PIT as a 
“multi-user import and export marine terminal for bulk, break-bulk, and 
other marine cargoes,” was to be built in Whatcom County’s Cherry 
Point Industrial Area, south of an existing ARCO oil refinery.32 Cherry 
Point has been described as “one of the richest, most productive and 
sensitive marine resource sites in Washington state.”33Among other 
things, Cherry Point is home to one of the most productive herring 
populations in the State of Washington.34 In 2000, the Washington 
                                                 
27. See Letter from Stanley R. Cowdell, Agent for Pacific International Terminals, Westmar 
Consultants, Inc., to US Army Corps of Engineers, Seattle District Regulatory Branch (Dec. 26, 
1991), available at http://www.co.whatcom.wa.us/pds/plan/current/gpt-ssa/pdf/1991-92- 
documents.pdf. 
28. See History, SSA MARINE, http://www.ssamarine.com/company/history.html (last visited 
June 9, 2014). 
29. See US-Canadian Venture to Develop Bulk Terminals on West Coast, J. COM. (May 9, 
1991). 
30. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58. 
31. See Letter from Robert M. Tull to John Tyler, Whatcom County Department of Buildings 
& Code (June 18, 1992), available at http://www.co.whatcom.wa.us/pds/plan/current/gpt-
ssa/pdf/1991-92-documents.pdf.  
32. See Public Notice, Whatcom County, Determination of Significance and Request for 
Comments on Scope of EIS 1 (Dec. 4, 1995), available at 
http://www.co.whatcom.wa.us/pds/plan/current/gpt-ssa/pdf/1995-eis-scoping.pdf. 
33. See David M. Schmaltz, Deliberations Continue on Proposed Fifth Deep Water Pier at 
Cherry Point, 7(12) WHATCOM WATCH (Dec. 1998), available at http://www.whatcomwatch.org/ 
old_issues/v7i12.html#story1. Similarly, the area has been described as a “living jewel” for 
Washington and its citizens. See also Our Living Jewel – Cherry Point Aquatic Reserve, WHATCOM 
WATCH (October/November 2012), available at http://www.whatcomwatch.org/pdf_content/ 
OurLivingJewelOct2012.pdf. 
34. As one critic of the Gateway Pacific Terminal has observed, “Herring are the cornerstone 
of the marine food chain and are extremely important to the lives of salmon, seabirds, waterfowl, 
marine fish and marine mammals during their entire life history.” See Schmaltz, supra note 33. Yet, 
despite the historical abundance of herring at Cherry Point, in 2000 the Washington Department of 
Fish and Wildlife listed the Cherry Point herring stock as “critical,” a category reserved for wildlife 
populations are depressed enough that “permanent damage to [the] population is likely or has 
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Department of Natural Resources set the area aside as a State 
Environmental Aquatic Reserve — a decision that signifies its 
importance not only to Pacific herring, but also to the endangered 
Chinook Salmon, waterfowl, and other wildlife such as bald eagles and 
marine mammals.35 The area has been designated as a “shoreline of 
statewide significance.”36 Finally, Cherry Point provides significant 
Dungeness crab habitat and it is of high importance to the commercial 
crabbing industry.37 
 As originally proposed, the terminal would have consisted of a 100-
foot wide, 2,100-foot long wharf with a 30-foot wide, 1,200-foot long 
approach trestle; a 70- to 80-acre upland storage area located 
immediately adjacent to the shoreline (with both covered and uncovered 
storage areas, depending on the export product); and an extended, 100-
acre rail loop for transporting cargo to the facility from the adjacent 
BNSF Railway track.38 Under that configuration (and then-existing 
market conditions) the facility was anticipated to result in approximately 
140 vessel calls per year.39 Train traffic to and from the facility was 
never studied, but the facility was expected to receive (and export) up to 
8.2 million tons of cargo annually.40 
                                                                                                             
already occurred.” See Petition to List the Cherry Point Population of Pacific Herring, Clupea 
Pallasi, as “threatened” or “endangered” under the endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq. 
at 8 (Jan. 21, 2004) available at http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/species/fish/Cherry_Point_ 
Pacific_herring/pdfs/71069_6360.pdf.  More recently, the Department of Fish and Wildlife has 
reported that “The Cherry Point population has dramatically declined from 15,000 tons in the 1970s 
to less than 1,000 tons in 2010.” See Pacific Herring Information Summary, WASH. DEP’T OF FISH 
AND WILDLIFE, available at  http://wdfw.wa.gov/conservation/fisheries/PacificHerringInformation 
_121911.pdf. 
35. See Withdrawal Order for Cherry Point State Aquatic Reserve, WASH. DEP’T OF NAT. RES. 
(Aug. 1, 2000), available at http://www.dnr.wa.gov/Publications/aqr_rsve_chpt_comm_order.pdf; 
see also Represented Ecological Resources Identified for the Cherry Point Planning Area, WASH. 
DEP’T OF NAT. RES. (Nov. 20, 2007), available at  http://www.dnr.wa.gov/Publications/aqr_rsve_ 
chpt_ecologic _resource.pdf; Critical Habitat Designation for 19 Evolutionary Significant Units of 
Salmon and Steelhead in Washington, Oregon, Idaho, and California, 65 Fed. Reg. 7777 (Feb. 16, 
2000) (designating the area as critical habitat for Chinook Salmon). 
36. Title 23: Shoreling Management Program, WHATCOM CNTY. PLANNING & DEV. NAT. RES. 
MGMT. 32 (August 8, 2008) http://www.co.whatcom.wa.us/pds/naturalresources/shorelines/pdf/ 
SMP_CountyApproved_EcologyApproved_090323_clean_000.pdf. 
37. See Our Living Jewel — Cherry Point Aquatic Reserve, WHATCOM WATCH 14 
(October/Nov. 2012), available at http://www.whatcomwatch.org/pdf_content/OurLivingJewelOct 
2012.pdf.  
38. Letter from Robert M. Tull to John Tyler, supra note 31. 
39. See Gateway Pacific Terminal: Draft Environmental Impact Statement, WHATCOM CNTY. 
PLANNING AND DEV. SERVS. II-2 (Dec. 1996), available at http://www.co.whatcom.wa.us/pds/plan/ 
current/gpt-ssa/pdf/1996-draft-eis.pdf.  
40. See Gateway Pacific Terminal: Final Environmental Impact Statement, WHATCOM CNTY. 
PLANNING AND DEV. SERVS. II-8 (Feb. 1997), available at http://www.co.whatcom.wa.us/pds/plan/ 
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 In December of 1996, Whatcom County issued a Draft 
Environmental Impact Statement (“DEIS”) for the original Gateway 
Pacific Terminal,41 followed by a Final Environmental Impact Statement 
(“FEIS”) in February of 1997.42 The EISs found few unavoidable 
significant adverse impacts to the environment (a decision that would 
later be challenged).43 On May 14, 1997, the Whatcom County Council 
approved PIT’s application for a substantial shoreline permit and a major 
development permit after review by the County’s hearing examiner.44 
 Notably, however, the proponent of the original Gateway Pacific 
Terminal never identified it as a potential export point for coal, an 
omission that likely caused the EISs to underestimate its impact on the 
environment.45. Instead, it was proposed to handle and export a number 
of other dry bulk commodities including alumina, automobiles, salt, 
scrap metal, grain, ores, green petroleum coke, rock, feed pellets, potash, 
and wood chips.46 Accordingly, the Council’s decision authorized the 
terminal to be used for exporting the commodities identified above.47 It 
did not authorize the facility to be used for coal, and nor did it consider 
the potential climate change impacts associated that new use.  
                                                                                                             
current/gpt-ssa/pdf/1997-final-eis.pdf. 
41. See WHATCOM CNTY. PLANNING AND DEV. SERVS., supra note 39. The DEIS was 
published five years after PIT submitted its application for approval of the terminal facility. While a 
seemingly long period of time, during that five years PIT spent substantial time wrangling with 
various state and federal agencies over the size of the facility’s materials handling wharf. See 
generally Gateway Pacific Terminal Project – Documents from 2011 and back, Planning and 
Development Services, WHATCOM COUNTY (1993), http://www.co.whatcom.wa.us/pds/plan/current/ 
gpt-ssa/documents-2011.jsp. During this time, PIT was also required to study the facility’s expected 
impacts on wetlands and other marine resources. See id. (1994 Natural Resources Report and 1995 
Wetland Report).  
42. See WHATCOM CNTY. PLANNING AND DEV. SERVS., supra note 40. 
43. See WHATCOM CNTY. PLANNING AND DEV. SERVS., supra note 39, at  I-7 - I-24;  
WHATCOM CNTY. PLANNING AND DEV. SERVS., supra note 40, at I-7 - I-24. 
44. See Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Major Development Permit and Substantial 
Development Decision, In re: Application for Major Dev. Permit and Shoreline Substantial Dev. 
Permit by Gateway Pacific Terminal, Nos. MDP92-0003 and SHS9200020 (May 13, 1997), 
available at https://www.ezview.wa.gov/Portals/_1357/images/ 
default/MDP%20SHS%20Permits.pdf. 
45. For example, neither the DEIS nor the FEIS assessed the potential climate change impacts 
of the original terminal proposal, which is now one of the most controversial effects associated with 
the facility’s new anticipated use as a coal export facility. See WHATCOM CNTY. PLANNING AND 
DEV. SERVS., supra note 39, at I-7 - I-24 (listing impacts assessed under SEPA); WHATCOM CNTY. 
PLANNING AND DEV. SERVS., supra note 40, at I-7 - I-24 
46. See WHATCOM CNTY. PLANNING AND DEV. SERVS., supra note 39, at I-2. 
47. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Major Development Permit and Substantial 
Development Decision, supra note 44, at 10.  
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B. The 1997 Lawsuit 
 In 1997, the Washington Department of Ecology and Department of 
Fish and Wildlife (together with a coalition of environmental groups 
including, the Washington Environmental Council, the North Cascade 
Audubon Society, People for Puget Sound, League of Women Voters of 
Bellingham, and Ocean Advocates) appealed Whatcom County’s FEIS to 
Washington’s Shoreline Hearings Board. The lawsuit resulted in a 
comprehensive settlement requiring PIT to re-evaluate the Gateway 
Pacific Terminal’s impact on the environment. Among other things, the 
settlement required PIT to undertake a comprehensive vessel traffic 
study, including: (1) an analysis of the risk of vessel collisions under the 
congested traffic conditions that would be caused by the terminal; (2) to 
undertake a herring monitoring study and to assess vessel impacts on the 
population; and (3) to mitigate impacts to the 5.85 acres of wetlands that 
the project would fill.48  
 These provisions were incorporated into PIT’s permits as a 
condition of construction. And they reflect the community’s concern that 
the project, even as originally proposed in 1992, sans-coal, would have 
had much greater impacts on the environment than Whatcom County 
originally predicted.  
C. The Current Proposal 
 The project languished for several years after the 1997 lawsuit was 
settled, but in 2011 PIT renewed its interest in the project and applied for 
permits to build a greatly-expanded and reconfigured export facility. For 
the first time, PIT also announced in 2011 that it intended to use the 
facility to export coal.49  
 Under the revised terminal concept, the Gateway Pacific Terminal 
would consist of two storage areas which had been moved from an area 
immediately adjacent to the shoreline to an area further to the north. The 
two storage areas would now consist of an 80-acre, uncovered storage 
area to be used primarily to store 2.75 million metric tons of coal at any 
                                                 
48. See Settlement Agreement: Pacific International Terminals Shoreline Substantial Permits 
SHS 92-0020 and SHB Appeals Numbers 97-22 and 97-23, WHATCOM CNTY. (March 1996), 
available at http://www.co.whatcom.wa.us/pds/plan/current/gpt-ssa/pdf/1999-settlementagreement. 
pdf; see also Stipulation & Order of Dismissal, Washington Environmental Council, et al. v. 
Whatcom County et al., No. 97-22 & 97-23 (Aug. 20, 1999), available at  
http://www.co.whatcom.wa.us/pds/plan/current/gpt-ssa/pdf/1999-stipulation-order-of-dismissal.pdf. 
49. See Project Information Document, Gateway Pacific Terminal, WHATCOM CNTY. 1-9 (Feb. 
28, 2011) available at  http://www.co.whatcom.wa.us/pds/plan/current/gpt-ssa/pdf/2011-02-28-
project-info-doc.pdf.  
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given time (the “East Loop”),50 and a smaller, two-acre covered storage 
area for potash and petroleum coke (the “West Loop”).51 The revised 
project would impact 140 acres of wetlands (as opposed to the 5.85 acres 
anticipated under the original terminal concept).52 It would result in 
approximately 487 ship calls per year (as opposed to the 140 annual ship 
calls anticipated under the original concept).53 The rail loop associated 
with the project grew from 100 acres to 300 acres.54 The revised facility 
would use the same wharf and trestle configuration as the County 
permitted in 1997, but at much higher capacity. Finally, both the East 
Loop and the West Loop would straddle a small county road called 
Lonseth Road. Lonseth Road cuts across the entirety of the two storage 
areas and the associated rail loop, and the County would need to vacate 
the road (i.e., sell it to PIT) for PIT to build the re-designed facility.55 
PIT plans to ask the county to vacate the road after the project is 
approved.56 
 Through a confusing series of decisions and communications with 
PIT, Whatcom County determined that the original permits from 1997 — 
which were conditioned on the performance of the settlement agreement 
— were still in effect. This raised the initial possibility that PIT would 
not be required to undergo a second-round environmental review prior to 
constructing its revised terminal project57 But several environmental 
groups pushed back, including Climate Solutions, the Sierra Club, and 
                                                 
50. See id. at 4-7. As one observer has noted, this 80-acre uncovered coal storage area (and the 
attendant “fugitive dust” that may escape the area and pollute nearby lands and waters) is what 
“particularly distinguishes” the revised, 2011 terminal concept from the earlier, 1992 design. See 
Terry Wechsler, Gateway Pacific Terminal: History, Scoping and a Discussion of Implications, 
WHATCOM WATCH (October-November, 2012), available at http://www.whatcomwatch.org 
/php/WW_open.php?id=1489. 
51. See PACIFIC INT’L TERMINALS, INC., supra note 2, at 1-9. 
52. Id. at 5-70. The project would also result in direct impacts to more than 12,814 linear feet 
of streams and ditches tributary to the waters off Cherry Point. 
53. Id. at 4-54. The increased vessel traffic is especially troubling in light of a recent report 
that, even under PIT’s prior estimate of 140 vessel calls per year, the Gateway Pacific Terminal 
could result in a 62 percent increase in the risk of a major fuel spill. See Van Dorp et al., Assessment 
of Oil Spill Risk due to Potential Increased Vessel Traffic at Cherry Point, Washington, GEORGE 
WASH. UNIV. 67 (Aug. 31, 2008) available at http://www.seas.gwu.edu/~dorpjr/VTRA/FINAL 
%20REPORT/083108/VTRA%20REPORT%20-%20Main%20Report%20083108.pdf. See also 
Wechsler, supra note 49.  
54. PACIFIC INT’L TERMINALS, INC., supra note 2, at 1-5, I-7 (Fig. 1-2). 
55.  Id. at 4-1, 4-5 (Figure 4-1), 4-13 (Figure 4-4).  
56. Id. at 1-10. 
57. See CHAD YUNGE & DAVID STALHEIM, WHATCOM COUNTY PLANNING & DEVELOPMENT 
SERVICES, ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATION (October 22, 2008), available at 
http://www.co.whatcom.wa.us/pds/plan/current/gpt-ssa/pdf/2008-SHR2008-00019.pdf (concerning  
MDP92-0003 and SHS92-0020). 
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RE Sources for Sustainable Communities. In response, the County 
amended its position and held, instead, that new permits will be required 
for the revised portions of the project. In particular, the environmental 
groups noted that the increased capacity of the facility — together with 
the addition of coal to the terminals export roster — raised serious 
questions about whether a new shoreline permit would be needed as 
well.58 Reflecting these concerns about increased vessel traffic and the 
addition of coal, the County determined on June 23, 2011, that a new 
shoreline permit would be required for the upland portions of the revised 
project.59 PIT disagreed with that decision, but it missed its appeal 
deadline to challenge it.60  
 The County did, however, explain that the issues and 
determinations made in the prior permit decision (the 1992 project) 
would give “flavor and substance”61 to the new permit process. Of 
course, “flavor and substance” is an amorphous standard that the County 
will need to flesh out as the new proposal makes its way through the 
County’s local review process. For now, the public can only assume that 
all of the regulatory considerations that relate to the granting or denial of 
a shorelines permit — discussed below — are open to debate and may be 
applied to the revised Gateway Pacific Terminal application. In all, 
whatever “flavor and substance” might turn out to mean, PIT’s 
obligation to obtain new permits (rather than rely on the original 1997 
permits) means that the County will have wide leeway to re-evaluate the 
project, in its entirety, under the County’s local environmental codes.  
D. Federal, State, and Local Review Framework  
 Review of the revived Gateway Pacific Terminal will require 
analysis under a slew of federal, state, and local environmental laws.  
                                                 
58. See Letter from Jan Hasselman and Kristen Boyles, Earthjustice, to Tyler Schroeder, 
Whatcom County Planning & Development, Gateway Pacific Terminal Major Project Permit 
Application (June 17, 2011), available at  http://www.co.whatcom.wa.us/pds/plan/current/gpt-
ssa/pdf/2011-june11-17-gpt-emails.pdf. 
59. See Letter from Tyler Schroeder, Whatcom County Planning Supervisor, to Pacific 
International Terminals, Inc. (June 23, 2011), available at http://www.co 
.whatcom.wa.us/pds/plan/current/gpt-ssa/pdf/20110623-gptdetermination.pdf. 
60. See Letter from Tyler Schroeder, Whatcom Planning Supervisor, to William T. Lynn (July 
11, 2011), available at http://www.co.whatcom.wa.us/pds/plan/current/gpt-ssa/pdf/20110711-wc-
response-to-request-for-reconsideration.pdf. 
61. See id.  
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 At the federal level, the wharf and trestle will require permits under 
Section 404 of the federal Clean Water Act62 and the Rivers and Harbors 
Act.63 It must also undergo a comprehensive environmental review under 
the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), 64 which has been 
described as “our basic national charter for protection of the 
environment.”65 In essence, compliance with these laws is required 
before the Corps authorizes PIT to place any “fill” or “structures” into 
the waters off Cherry Point. For example, NEPA requires a 
comprehensive environmental review of “major federal actions” that 
significantly affect the quality of the human environment, including any 
project requiring a federal permit.66 Further, NEPA requires an 
assessment of direct, indirect, and cumulative impacts, which could 
require the Corps to evaluate wide-ranging impacts from the project 
(including its contribution to global warming by feeding Asian power 
markets hungry for more coal).67  
 But for better or for worse, and despite the apparent irony, NEPA 
will not be the vehicle through which a truly comprehensive 
environmental review will be undertaken. The Army Corps has 
determined that, in its opinion, many of the most controversial impacts 
associated with the facility (including climate change impacts associated 
with exporting more coal to Asian power markets) are not subject to 
NEPA.68   
                                                 
62. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2006). In combination, Sections 301 and 404 of the Clean Water forbid 
the placement of any “fill material” into the waters of the United States without a permit first being 
issued by the United States Army Corps of Engineers. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a)(1).  
63. 33 U.S.C. § 403 et seq. Similar to the Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, the Rivers and 
Harbors Act requires an Army Corps permit for the placement of any “structure” in the navigable 
waters of the United States. Id.  
64. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370h (2006). The project will also require review and consultation 
under the federal Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531–1544, because it requires the issuance 
of a federal permit and “may affect” several threatened and endangered species, including Chinook 
salmon and the Marbled Murrelet.  
65. See 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(a); Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Blackwood, 161 F.3d 
1208, 1215 (9th Cir. 1998). 
66. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2006). 
67. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8. See also id. at § 1508.7 (Defining “cumulative impact” to mean 
“the impact on the environment which results from the incremental impact of the action when added 
to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions regardless of what agency (federal or 
non-federal) or person undertakes such other actions.”).  
68. See Memorandum for Record from Bruce A. Estok, Colonel, Corps of Engineers (July 3, 
2013), available at http://www.nws.usace.army.mil/Portals/27/docs/regulatory/News/ 
SCOPEMFRGATEWAYBNSF.pdf (regarding the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers scope of analysis 
and extent of impact evaluation for National Environmental Policy Act Environmental Impact 
Statement). The Corps based its decision to not study these impacts on its lack of direct regulatory 
control over the burning of coal in Asian power plants. See id. at 6. But as noted elsewhere, the 
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 Instead, a truly comprehensive environmental review will only be 
undertaken at the state and local level, under Washington’s State 
Environmental Policy Act (“SEPA”). Like NEPA, SEPA requires an 
exhaustive review of the project’s impacts.69 But unlike the Army Corps’ 
decision to limit its review under NEPA to direct, local impacts, on July 
31, 2013, the Department of Ecology announced that the entire project 
will be submitted to what has been called a “life cycle” analysis.70 In 
addition to direct impacts, this life cycle analysis will consider 
greenhouse gas (“GHG”) impacts of coal combusted in Asian power 
plants, impacts along the entire rail line leading to the Gateway Pacific 
Terminal, and impacts in states such as Montana and Wyoming where 
the coal is expected to be mined.71 In other words, the Gateway Pacific 
Terminal will face two levels of environmental review — a 
comprehensive state-level review under SEPA and a more narrow federal 
review under NEPA. 
 Ecology’s decision to take a life-cycle approach under SEPA has 
been heralded as a victory for opponents to the Gateway Pacific 
Terminal.72 But it has also been criticized as overbroad and 
“unprecedented,” and pro-coal interests have demonized the decision as 
an attack on industry in general.73 These criticisms have been fueled, in 
large part, by the Corps’ decision to take a much narrower approach to its 
review of the project under NEPA.74 But the Corps’ decision 
notwithstanding, several federal agencies are already beginning to 
                                                                                                             
Corps’ position betrays a misunderstanding between federal control over actions (which triggers the 
duty to review impacts under NEPA) and direct regulatory control over the impacts themselves 
(which much be studied under NEPA so long as they are reasonably foreseeable). See ELIZABETH 
SHEARGOLD & SMITA WALAVALKAR, COLUMBIA CENTER FOR CLIMATE CHANGE LAW, COLUMBIA 
LAW SCHOOL, NEPA and Downstream Greanhouse Gas Emissions of U.S. Coal Exports (August 
2013), available at http://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/climate-change/files/ 
Publications/Fellows /NEPA%20and%20Review%20of%20Coal%20Exports.pdf. 
69. See WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.030. 
70. See Letter from Rob McKenna, supra note 20, at 2. 
71. See EISGATEWAYPACIFICWA.GOV, supra note 19. 
72. See Lefty Coaster, In Big Victory for NW Coal Export Terminal Opponents Climate 
Impacts Will Be Considered by the State, DAILY KOS (July 31, 2013, 6:03 PM), 
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/07/31/1228063/-In-Big-Victory-for-NW-coal-export-terminal-
opponents-Army-Corps-will-consider-Climate-Impacts. 
73. See, e.g., Dick Settle, Pat Schneider & Beth Clark, Ecology Requires Unprecedented 
Global SEPA Analysis, FOSTER PEPPER PLLC (August 2, 2013), http://www.foster.com/ 
newsroom.aspx?nid=684. 
74. See, e.g., Erik Smith, Army Corps, Ecology Announce Divorce – Will Write Separate 
Environmental Impact Statements on Coal Ports, WASH. STATE WIRE (Sept. 7, 2013) 
http://washingtonstatewire.com/blog/army-corps-ecology-announce-divorce-will-write-separate-
environmental-impact-statements-on-coal-ports/; see also Letter from Rob McKenna, supra note 20, 
at 3.   
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include life-cycle evaluations of GHG emissions in their NEPA 
analyses.75 The United States Environmental Protection agency itself 
urged the Corps to take a more comprehensive approach under NEPA76 
(a request that the Corps ignored). And as Maia Bellon (Director of 
Washington’s Department of Ecology) recently noted,77 the regulations 
implementing SEPA specifically require each state agency, in conducting 
its environmental assessment, to look at impacts beyond Washington’s 
borders. See WAC 197-11-060(4)(b) (“In assessing the significance of an 
impact, a lead agency shall not limit its consideration of a proposal’s 
impacts only to those aspects within its jurisdiction, including local or 
state boundaries . . .”).  Thus, as far as SEPA is concerned, there should 
be little dispute about Ecology’s authority to require disclosure of GHG 
emissions in Asia, or impacts in other states, as part of its review of the 
Gateway Pacific Terminal. Indeed, such review is required under 
SEPA.78  
 At the local level, Whatcom County will also be required to study 
the environmental impacts of the project under SEPA,79 and it will be 
doing so as a “co-lead agency” alongside the Department of Ecology.80 
                                                 
75. See SHEARGOLD & WALAVALKAR, supra note 68. 
76. See Letter from Dennis J. McLerran, Regional Administrator for U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency Region 10, to Randel Perry, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (January 22, 2013) 
available at http://www.eisgatewaypacificwa.gov/sites/default/files/content/files/EPA_Reg10_ 
McLerran.pdf (noting that review of the Gateway Pacific Terminal under NEPA should include an 
evaluation of “impacts along the full route associated with transportation of dry bulk goods, 
including coal, to the new terminal,” as well as “effects in the United States from combustion of the 
exported coal.”). 
77. See Letter from Maia Bellon, supra note 8. 
78. In addition to SEPA, NEPA may also require an assessment of down-stream GHG 
emissions notwithstanding the Corps’ decision to exclude such impacts from its review. See Mid 
States Coal. for Progress v. Surface Transp. Bd., 345 F.3d 520, 549 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that the 
federal Surface Transportation Board violated NEPA by failing to consider impacts relating to the 
downstream burning of coal before approving a new rail line in Wyoming coal country, and 
explaining that “it is reasonably foreseeable — indeed it is almost certainly true — that the proposed 
project will increase the long-term demand for coal and any adverse effects that result from burning 
coal.”); Border Power Plan Working Group v. U.S. Dept. of Energy, 260 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1033 
(S.D. Cal. May 2, 2003) (holding that NEPA analysis of electricity transmission corridor must 
consider downstream impact of power plants across U.S. border). See also SHEARGOLD & 
WALAVALKAR, supra note 68.  
79. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.030 (requiring “all branches of government . . . including state 
agencies, municipal and public corporations, and counties” to comply with SEPA).  
80. See Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”) between the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 
Whatcom County, and Washington State Department of Ecology (Oct. 12, 2011), available at 
http://www.ecy.wa.gov/geographic/gatewaypacific/20111024_mou_jointreview.pdf; see also 
Amendment to the Memorandum of Understanding between the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 
Whatcom County and Washington State Department of Ecology (Sept. 18, 2013), available at 
http://www.ecy.wa.gov/geographic/gatewaypacific/20130918_mou_amendment_signed.pdf. 
298 Seattle Journal of Environmental Law [Vol. 4:1 
 
The County will also be required to review the project under 
Washington’s Shoreline Management Act81 and under the local zoning 
and development codes which impose unique environmental 
requirements on the project.  
 Local review of the project will involve an analysis of impacts on 
the natural environment. For example, the County’s shoreline regulations 
authorize it to take action broadly to protect commercial shellfish beds82 
and other fish and wildlife populations (including the Pacific herring),83 
as well as to balance “[p]otential  short-term economic gains or 
convenience . . . against potential long-term and/or costly impairment of 
natural features.”84 The local zoning code contains requirements relating 
to dust suppression, a big issue in light of the massive uncovered coal 
storage piles planned for the facility.85 And, as a prerequisite to obtaining 
a Major Development Permit for the upland portion of the facility, the 
Whatcom County Code may even require PIT to mitigate any impacts 
imposed on Whatcom County that result from climate change.86 Finally, 
                                                 
81. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58. 
82. See Whatcom County Code § 23.40.030(H) (2014) (“Resources and ecological systems of 
shorelines of statewide significance should be protected. Shorelands and submerged lands should be 
protected to accommodate current and projected demand for economic resources of statewide 
importance such a commercial shellfish beds.”).  
83. See Whatcom County Code § 23.40.030(I) (2014) (“Those limited shorelines containing 
unique, scarce and/or sensitive resources should be protected to the maximum extent feasible.”). See 
also Whatcom County Code § 23.20.060.B.4 (requiring the County to “[b]alance the location, 
design, and management of shoreline uses throughout the county to prevent a net loss of shoreline 
ecological functions and processes over time.”).  
84. Whatcom County Code § 23.40.030(F) (2014). 
85. See Whatcom County Code § 20.68.704 (“No odors, dust, dirt, or smoke shall be emitted 
that are detectable, at or beyond the property line for the use concerned, in such a concentration or of 
such duration as to cause a public nuisance, or threaten health or safety, or to unreasonably infringe 
upon the use and enjoyment of property beyond the boundaries of the district.”). See also Wechsler, 
supra note 50. 
86. See Whatcom County Code 20.88.130(6) (requiring permit applicant to demonstrate that 
the project “[w]ill not impose uncompensated requirements for public expenditures for additional 
utilities, facilities, and services, and will not impose any uncompensated costs on other property 
owned.”) (emphasis added). By prohibiting the imposition of “any uncompensated costs,” this 
requirement may be interpreted to require PIT to compensate the County for any anticipated costs 
associated with County responses to climate change impacts. Similarly, Whatcom County Code 
20.88.150 may be interpreted to authorize the County to take action to mitigate impacts of global 
warming. That provision provides that the County may impose any reasonable conditions precedent 
to the establishment of the major development as may be required to mitigate impacts of the 
proposal on the natural environment of the county, and to protect the health, safety and general 
welfare of the people of the county consistent with the policies for environmental protection set forth 
in the comprehensive plan. Whatcom County Code 20.88.150. Especially relevant to Cherry Point, 
the Whatcom County Comprehensive Plan contains many goals and policies for the protection of the 
natural environment, including the strong discouragement of “any activity which might cause 
significant degradation of the fishery resource or habitat,” and the “protection and enhancement of 
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the County’s “substantive authority” under SEPA gives the County wide 
leeway to disapprove the project based on virtually any “significant” 
adverse impacts whatsoever. In particular, SEPA not only requires full 
disclosure of a project’s significant environmental impacts, but also 
supplements the existing authority of every city, county, and state agency 
to deny projects based on their environmental impacts — provided, 
however, that the city, county, or agency has adopted policies to 
implement this authority.87  In turn, the County’s implementing SEPA 
policies give it an exceedingly broad range of authority to prevent 
adverse environmental impacts.88 Together, these policies allow the 
County to take action broadly to deny a permit application whenever the 
County’s SEPA review identifies a significant adverse environmental 
impact, provided that the impact is not mitigated.89 
 In all, state and local review of the project will involve a wide 
variety of environmental impacts. These range from impacts on local 
natural resources like wetlands and fish and wildlife habitat, to impacts 
on the area resulting from the burning of coal in Asian power plants, to 
impact wholly outside the State of Washington (including impacts along 
the entire rail line stretching from coal mines in Wyoming, Montana, and 
North Dakota, to the Gateway Pacific Terminal itself).  
E. Threats of Litigation 
 It is unclear how the Gateway Pacific Terminal will fair under the 
state and federal environmental laws discussed above, and it will be 
years before federal, state, and local review of the project is complete.90 
                                                                                                             
fish and wildlife habitat through site design and new development.” See Whatcom County 
Comprehensive Plan at 11-23 (Policies 11-J1 and 11J-4). 
87. See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.21C.060.  
88. See generally Whatcom County Code § 16.08.160(D) (2014). (authorizing the County to 
take action necessary to act “as trustee of the environment for succeeding generations”; to “[a]ssure 
for all people of Washington safe, healthful, productive, and aesthetically and culturally pleasing 
surroundings”; to “[p]reserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of our natural 
heritage”; and to “[a]chieve a balance between population and resource use which will permit high 
standards of living and a wide sharing of life’s amenities[.]”).  
89. See Whatcom County Code § 16.08.160(C) (2014); see also Whatcom County Code 
20.188.130(7) (requiring every project to “be appropriately responsive to any EIS prepared for the 
project” under SEPA).  
90. According to the Washington Department of Ecology, the draft EIS for the Gateway 
Pacific Terminal is scheduled to be released sometime in 2015; and the final EIS is not scheduled to 
be completed until 2016 or later. See WASH. DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, supra note 3. And it is not until 
those reviews are completed that Whatcom County may even begin to review the project under its 
local zoning and development codes. As one commentator has noted, “It has taken 20 months for the 
agencies to issue their scoping notices, the draft EIS is predicted to take approximately two years, 
and preparation of the final EIS will take an unknown additional time.  Only then will a multi-year 
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What is clear, however, is that proponents of the project are already 
brainstorming ways to undercut those laws and the potentially negative 
treatment that the terminal might receive under them. One potential 
avenue for undercutting these laws has to do with commerce — or more 
specifically, interference with commerce.   
 Shortly after learning of Ecology’s decision to subject the Gateway 
Pacific Terminal to a “life-cycle” review under SEPA, Montana and 
North Dakota expressed their opinion that such review is 
unconstitutional. In particular, they objected that any consideration of 
climate change impacts resulting from the burning of coal exported from 
the Gateway Pacific Terminal would exceed the State’s regulatory 
jurisdiction, as well as offend the Commerce Clause of the United States 
Constitution.91 They stated that any consideration of impacts along the 
railway line outside Washington’s borders would be objectionable for the 
same reasons.92  
 But they did not stop there. Instead, Montana and North Dakota 
intimated that any denial of the project would violate the constitution 
because impacts of the decision would fall squarely on companies 
engaged in interstate and international commerce. In their own words, 
“[t]he effect of any decision [by Washington] to limit or prohibit coal 
exports would fall entirely upon other states, including Montana and 
neighboring states.”93 As a result, they argue that any denial of the 
facility would be “objectionable under the commerce clause of the U.S. 
Constitution” because it would “impose upon other states the costs of a 
policy decision in the State of Washington, by discriminating against 
products produced in other states in applying [Washington’s] regulatory 
jurisdiction.”94  
 In essence, Montana and North Dakota are on record as stating that 
any decision to deny the project, to the extent that it relates to the 
movement of coal in interstate and international commerce, would be 
unconstitutional. And it can be expected that other proponents of the 
project will raise similar challenges should the Whatcom County Council 
(or the State) disapprove the project. 
                                                                                                             
permitting process for the terminal be able to commence, with appeals surely to follow.” See 
SHEARGOLD & WALAVALKAR, supra note 68.  
91. See Letter from Rob McKenna, supra note 20, at 4. 
92. Id.  
93. Id. at 5 (emphasis added).  
94. Id.  
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III. OVERVIEW OF THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE 
 The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution provides 
that “Congress shall have power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce with 
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian 
Tribes.”95 By its express terms, the Commerce Clause vests jurisdiction 
in the federal government in the regulation of interstate and international 
trade. But it also has an implied aspect known commonly as the dormant 
or Negative Commerce Clause. The dormant Commerce Clause is a 
judge-made doctrine that generally forbids the states from interfering 
with interstate or international commerce.96 It does so in two separate 
circumstances: the first deals with obstacles that target interstate trade, 
and the second deals with obstacles that do not specifically target 
interstate trade but that are nevertheless highly burdensome. 
 First, the dormant Commerce Clause forbids the states from passing 
laws that “discriminate” against interstate commerce either on the face of 
the statute, in its purpose, or in its effect. A statute and regulation that 
discriminates against interstate commerce in these ways is “‘virtually per 
se invalid’ . . . and will survive only if it ‘advances a legitimate local 
purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable 
nondiscriminatory alternatives.”97 That is so even when the state is acting 
to protect the local environment or natural resources, or pursuing some 
other essentially local end.98 In other words, virtually no end will justify 
a state or local law that discriminates against interstate commerce. 
 Second, even where a statute does not discriminate against interstate 
commerce, but rather has only an “incidental effect” on interstate 
commerce, it may still be struck down if it has an “undue burden” on 
                                                 
95. United States Const., Art. I, § 8.  
96. See Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 330 (1996) (explaining that “[t]he 
constitutional provision of power ‘[t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the several States,’ . . . has 
long been seen as a limitation on state regulatory powers, as well as an affirmative grant of 
congressional authority.”). 
97. Dept. of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 338 (2008), quoting Or. Waste Systems, 
Inc. v. Dept. of Envt’l Quality of the State of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 99(1994).  
98. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626 (1978) (striking down New 
Jersey law prohibiting the importation of solid waste originating outside the state, and explaining 
that “it does not matter whether the ultimate aim of [the law] is to reduce waste disposal costs of 
New Jersey residents or to save remaining open lands from pollution, for we assume that new Jersey 
has every right to protect its residents’ pocketbooks as well as their environment. . . . But whatever 
New Jersey’s ultimate purpose, it may not be accomplished by discriminating against articles of 
commerce coming from outside the State unless there is some reason, apart from their origin, to treat 
them differently.”).  
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interstate commerce.99 The undue burden prong of the dormant 
Commerce Clause is determined through a flexible balancing test known 
commonly as “Pike balancing,” after the United States Supreme Court’s 
decision in Pike v. Bruce Church.100 Under the Pike balancing test, a 
nondiscriminatory state or local law will be upheld unless its impacts on 
interstate commerce are “clearly excessive in relation to the putative 
local benefits.”101 In other words, a non-discriminatory local law will be 
upheld unless it is “‘unreasonable or irrational,’”102 and courts “‘should 
not second-guess the empirical judgments of lawmakers concerning the 
utility of legislation.’”103 In the Ninth Circuit, Pike balancing has also 
been referred to as the “minimal scrutiny test.”104  
 Both of these prongs105 of the dormant Commerce Clause serve the 
same basic purpose — the elimination of “economic protectionism,” i.e., 
“regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state economic interests by 
burdening out-of-state competitors.” But as discussed above, while 
economic protectionism may be the basis for dormant Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence, it is not the defining characteristic from a practical 
standpoint. No local interest will protect a law or state or local action that 
discriminates against interstate commerce. Instead, what decides the fate 
of a law or other state action is whether it discriminates against interstate 
commerce (in which case it will almost always be held invalid106) or has 
                                                 
99. Under this prong of the analysis, the word “incidental” is typically not understood to mean 
“slight” or “small,” but rather that the impacts on interstate commerce are “indirect” results of local 
action. See Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, Mich., 362 U.S. 440 (1960).  
100. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
101. Id.  
102. S.D. Myers, Inc. v. City and Cnty. of S.F., 253 F.3d 461, 471 (9th Cir. 2001), quoting Pac. 
Nw. Venison Producers v. Smitch, 20 F.3d 1008, 1017 (9th Cir. 1994). 
103. Id., quoting Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. City of Long Beach, 951 F.2d 977, 983 (9th Cir. 
1991). 
104. Black Star Farms LLC v. Oliver, 600 F.3d 1225, 1231 (9th Cir. 2010). While the burden 
of justifying state interests under Pike is “minimal,” one scholar has noted that, the Ninth Circuit, the 
state does bear some burden in justifying its policy choices under Pike. In particular, the state bears 
the burden of demonstrating that the putative local benefits of state action are “not illusory,” which 
has been described as rational basis review “with bite.” See James D. Fox, State Benefits under the 
Pike Balancing Test of the Dormant Commerce Clause: Putative or Actual?, 1 Ave Maria L. Rev. 
175, 203 (Spring 2003) (discussing Alaska Airlines v. City of Long Beach, 951 F.2d 977 (9th Cir. 
1991)).  
105. At least one circuit uses a three-part Dormant Commerce Clause Analysis, which contains 
a test even more lenient than the Pike balancing test to the least problematic state laws. See National 
Paint & Coatings Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 45 F.3d 1124, 1131 (7th Cir. 1995). However, the Ninth 
Circuit does not follow suit, and applies the two-part test described above. See, e.g., Black Star 
Farms LLC, 600 F.3d at 1231. 
106. In its history, the United States Supreme Court has upheld only one state or local law that 
overtly discriminated against interstate commerce. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986) 
(upholding Maine law prohibiting the importation of non-native bait fish).  
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only “incidental effects” on interstate commerce, in which case the law is 
more likely to be upheld.107  
IV. APPLICATION OF DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE 
 As discussed below, we believe that Whatcom County and the 
Washington Department of Ecology have authority to disapprove the 
Gateway Pacific Terminal which would not violate the dormant 
commerce clause.  
A. Whatcom County Has Significant Authority to Deny the Project in Its 
“Proprietary” Capacity. 
 Perhaps the simplest way for Whatcom County to block the 
Gateway Pacific Terminal, without risking potential dormant Commerce 
Clause implications, would be to simply refuse PIT’s request to vacate 
Lonseth road. As noted above, the proponent is well aware that its 
project requires the street to be vacated (i.e., for the County to essentially 
convey title to PIT), and it is unclear that the Gateway Pacific Terminal 
could be re-configured and built without Whatcom County giving up 
ownership of the road.108  
 It has long been held that state and local “proprietary” actions are 
immune from challenge under the dormant Commerce Clause. Most 
often, this principle is articulated in the context of the “market 
participant” exception to the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, under 
which states and local governments are free to discriminate against 
interstate commerce so long as they do so as participants in the free 
market, not as regulators of it.109 But the principle is equally applicable to 
                                                 
107. See Pac. Merch. Shipping Ass’n v. Goldstene, 639 F.3d 1154, 1177 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(explaining that local regulations that discriminate against interstate commerce “are generally struck 
down,” while local regulations having only an incidental effect on interstate commerce may be 
struck down “if the burdens they impose so outweigh the putative benefits so as to render the 
regulations unreasonable or irrational.”). 
108. See supra Part II.C.  
109. See, e.g., Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976) (explaining that 
“Nothing in the purposes animating the Commerce Clause prohibits a State, in the absence of 
Congressional action, from participating in the market and exercising the right to favor its own 
citizens over others.”) (footnotes omitted); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980) (“[S]tate 
proprietary activities may be, and often are burdened with the same restrictions imposed on private 
market participants. Evenhandedness suggests that, when acting as proprietors, States should 
similarly share existing freedoms from federal constraints, including the inherent limits of the 
Commerce Clause.”) (footnotes omitted). See also College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid 
Postsecondary Education Expense Board, 527 U.S. 666 (1999) (explaining that “The ‘market 
participant’ exception to judicially created dormant Commerce Clause restrictions makes sense 
because the evil addressed by those restrictions — the prospect that States will use custom duties, 
exclusionary trade regulations, and other exercises of governmental power (as opposed to the 
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other proprietary actions, such as a state choosing how and where it will 
spend its own money.110 Applied here, it is hard to imagine a clearer 
example of a city or county acting in a “proprietary” capacity than when 
it decides whether to sell its own real property to a private company. 
Thus, such a decision would likely be held immune to the restrictions of 
the dormant Commerce Clause.  
 Here, should the Whatcom County Council decide not to vacate 
Lonseth road for the construction of the Gateway Pacific Terminal, there 
would be little that PIT could do about it. That is so even if the County 
Council makes its decision based on an overtly discriminatory motive of 
hindering coal exports or any other aspect of interstate or international 
commerce. The very purpose of the proprietary action exception to the 
dormant Commerce Clause is to allow state and local governments to 
avoid the prohibition against interstate discrimination.  
 Moreover, the Council may consider restricting the use of Lonseth 
Road beyond a mere refusal to vacate the property if and when PIT asks 
it to. And one way of doing so might be to dedicate the road to a 
conservation trust, the terms of which might be drafted to preclude future 
development. Council seats may well turn over again before the County 
finishes its review of the terminal. And the current Council (with its 
perceived political will) might naturally consider tying the property up in 
this way to bind future members who could be more sympathetic to the 
project (and therefore more prone to transferring title to PIT). We are not 
aware of any cases that discuss dormant Commerce Clause problems 
with this sort of transaction. Dedication of the road to a trust could be a 
feasible and easily doable mechanism for blocking the terminal 
indefinitely.111  
                                                                                                             
expenditure of state resources) to favor their own citizens — is entirely absent where the States are 
buying and selling in the market.”) (internal citation omitted).  
110. See White v. Mass. Council of Const. Employees, 460 U.S. 204 (1983) (upholding city 
ordinance requiring all construction projects financed with public funds to use a workforce 
comprised of at least 50 percent city residents).  
111. Perhaps most problematic for this maneuver, the United States Supreme Court has held 
that while a state or local government may discriminate against interstate commerce when it initially 
disposes of public property, it may not use that authority to effectively regulate subsequent 
transactions in a manner that would interfere with interstate commerce. See South-Central Timber 
Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 98 (1984). However, in Wunnicke, the court confronted a 
situation in which Alaska was attempting to invoke the “market participant” exception to the 
dormant Commerce Clause (premised on its selling of state-owned timber), but also exceeding that 
exception by attaching sale restrictions intended to limit the actions of subsequent private 
purchasers. The Court held that such attempts to regulate down-stream economic activity violated 
the dormant Commerce Clause. But in doing so, the court emphasized that the “wrong” committed 
by Alaska that it was attempting to regulate commercial transactions involving property in which it 
no longer “retained a continuing proprietary interest.” Id. at 99. Here, were Whatcom County to 
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B. Whatcom County has Significant Authority to Protect Local Natural 
Resources from the Direct Impacts of the Gateway Pacific Terminal. 
 In addition to denying PIT’s request to vacate Lonseth Road, it is 
also likely that Whatcom County will avoid dormant Commerce Clause 
problems so long as it acts to protect local resources such as shellfish 
beds, herring and salmon populations, and other elements of the local 
natural environment from the direct effects of the project (i.e., the 
immediate effects of actions taking place within the County). As 
discussed below, mitigating the direct impacts of the project implicate 
purely local concerns unrelated to interstate commerce.   
 First, it is noteworthy that many of the local code provisions that 
might limit PIT’s ability to construct the Gateway Pacific Terminal 
(including those that would allow the County to consider climate change 
impacts) flow from the County’s zoning ordinance.112 Traditionally, 
zoning is a core area of state sovereignty.113 As one scholar has observed, 
virtually every zoning ordinance restricts interstate commerce (indeed, 
that is more often than not the very point of a zoning ordinance).114 But 
rather than invalidate such laws, courts have largely ignored issues 
arising in the Commerce Clause context even when the zoning ordinance 
likely discriminates against interstate commerce, such as local 
prohibitions on “big box” retail outlets.115 Exceptions exist when it is 
                                                                                                             
dedicate Lonseth Road to a trust, it would also be attempting to restrict future transactions. But 
unlike the situation in Wunnicke, the County would retain equitable title to the road and so would 
still have a continuing proprietary interest in it, thus avoiding the problem identified by the Supreme 
Court.   
112. See supra text accompanying note 85; see also supra text accompanying note 86 
(discussing applicable provisions contained in Chapter 20 of the Whatcom County Code, titled 
“Zoning.”).   
113. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 390 (1926) (upholding state 
zoning ordinance that created residential districts from which “business and trade of every sort” 
would be excluded). See also Schad v. Boroug of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 68 (1981) (“The 
power of local governments to zone and control land use is undoubtedly broad and its proper 
exercise is an essential aspect of achieving a satisfactory quality of life in both urban and rural 
communities.”). 
114. See John M. Baker & Mehmet K. Konar-Steenberg, “Drawn from Local Knowledge . . . 
and Conformed to Local Wants”: Zoning and Incremental Reform of dormant Commerce Clause 
Doctrine, 38 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 1, 17 (Fall 2006) (explaining that “[m]any ordinary zoning regulations 
are supposed to have a negative effect on commerce that is interstate in nature, particularly when 
those regulations are viewed in isolation”). 
115. See, e.g. Loesel v. City of Frankenmuth, 743 F.Supp.2d 619 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (upholding 
local overlay zone restricting the size of retail stores); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. City of Turlock, 483 
F. Supp. 2d 987 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (upholding city’s ordinance prohibiting large discount 
superstores). See also Wood Marine Serv., Inc. v. City of Harahan, 858 F.2d 1061, 1066 (5th Cir. 
1988) (upholding local zoning ordinance freezing commercial development of alluvial land along the 
Mississippi River); Randy’s Sanitation, Inc. v. Wright Cnty., 65 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1029 (D. Minn. 
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abundantly clear that state and local action is premised on overt hostility 
to interstate commerce.116 But the County’s review of the Gateway 
Pacific Terminal under the local zoning ordinance should already be 
weighted in favor of its constitutionality. This result has been questioned 
by some,117 but it nevertheless appears to be the practical reality of 
judicial reluctance to interfere with local zoning decisions on Commerce 
Clause grounds.  
 Second, it is likely that any action by the County to protect local 
resources would be reviewed under the state-friendly Pike balancing 
analysis (not the per se invalidation rule reserved for state laws that 
“discriminate” against out of state commerce). As discussed above, the 
first question that a court would ask when reviewing the County’s 
disapproval of the Gateway Pacific Terminal would be whether the 
action (or the code provision or statute under which the County acted) is 
discriminatory. In this case, the laws under which the County might act 
to disapprove the Gateway Pacific Terminal do not fall into any of the 
three categories of discrimination, and so would be scrutinized only 
under the state-friendly Pike balancing test.   
 There should be little argument that the laws under which the 
County could disapprove the Gateway Pacific Terminal are not 
discriminatory on their face. The County’s local zoning ordinance, 
shoreline ordinances, and SEPA are facially neutral with respect to 
intrastate and interstate projects and activities. It is far too early to know 
if any denial of the Gateway Pacific Terminal will be based on a 
“discriminatory motive” (though the Council’s mindfulness to avoid 
discriminatory statements to date is certainly a step in the right direction 
to avoiding that challenge).118 Further, while Montana and North Dakota 
have argued that any disapproval of the project would be 
                                                                                                             
1999) (denying summary judgment in claim alleging that county’s denial of re-zone application and 
conditional use permit was animated by animus toward interstate commerce, and explaining that 
“federal courts have traditionally been somewhat hesitant to interfere in the zoning process.”); Flava 
Works, Inc. v. City of Miami, 800 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1193 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (upholding local zoning 
ordinance prohibiting adult entertainment in residential area).   
116. See Island Silver & Spice, Inc. v. Islamorada, 475 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1287 (S.D. Fla. 
2007) (striking down local ordinance prohibiting big box retail, in part, because the city’s vice-
mayor admitted that the ordinance was intended to keep “them darn chain stores” from being built), 
aff’d at 542 F.3d 844 (11th Cir. 2008).  
117. See Brannon P. Denning, Dormant Commerce Clause Limits on the Regulation of Big 
Boxes and Chain Stores: An Update, 58 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1233 (2008) (arguing that the current 
reluctance of the judiciary to scrutinize local zoning ordinances under the dormant Commerce 
Clause is the result, in part, of judicial confusion about the doctrine).  
118. See E. Ky. Res. v. Fiscal Court of Magoffin Cnty., 127 F.3d 532 (6th Cir. 1997) 
(explaining that it is the burden of the challenger to prove that discriminatory motive infected the 
basis of government action).  
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“discriminatory” to the extent that it relates to the type of product being 
exported (coal),119 or imposes disparate impacts on interstate business or 
other states, neither consideration alone suffices to prove discriminatory 
effect.120  
 For example, the mere fact that denial of the Gateway Pacific 
Project would impact interstate businesses and other states does not 
demonstrate discriminatory effect. The United States Supreme Court has 
long held that the mere happenstance that a local law impacts interstate 
commerce more than intrastate commerce is not the relevant inquiry. In 
Exxon Corporation v. Governor of Maryland,121 the Court considered a 
law prohibiting oil producers and refiners from operating in-state retail 
operations, and it so happened that the only businesses burdened by the 
rule were out-of-state firms.122 But the Court nevertheless held that the 
law was neutral with respect to interstate commerce because it did not 
benefit any intrastate competitors (none existed) to the disadvantage of 
the out-of-state companies.123 In other words, it was merely a quirk of 
fact that the primary firms affected by the law were located out-of-state; 
the result was not the effect of the law.124  
 A similar result was reached in Norfolk Southern Corporation v. 
Oberly.125 There, the Third Circuit reviewed a Delaware statute banning 
bulk transfer facilities (including coal export facilities not unlike the 
proposed Gateway Pacific Terminal) from a portion of Delaware Bay.126 
Like proponents of the Gateway Pacific Terminal, the plaintiffs in 
Oberly complained that the law discriminated against interstate 
commerce because it precluded operation of interstate and international 
                                                 
119. See Letter from Rob McKenna, supra note 20, at 5 (arguing that Ecology’s life-cycle 
analysis violated the dormant Commerce Clause because “[t]he fact that the proposed exports 
include coal appears to be the determining factor in Ecology’s position on the Cherry Point 
Project.”). 
120. See id. (“The effect of any decision to limit or prohibit coal exports would fall entirely 
upon other states, including Montana and neighboring states. A regulatory decision that is 
discriminatory in this fashion is doubly objectionable under the commerce clause of the U.S. 
Constitution.”). 
121. Exxon Corp. et al. v. Governor of Md. et al., 437 U.S. 117 (1978). 
122. See id. at 125.  
123. Id. (acknowledging that impacts of law would “fall solely on interstate companies” but 
holding that “this fact does not lead, either logically or as a practical matter, to a conclusion that the 
State is discriminating against interstate commerce . . .”). 
124. See also AES Sparrows Point LNG, LLC v. Smith, 539 F. Supp. 2d 788, 799-800 (D. Md. 
2007) (holding that local prohibition on LNG export facility did not discriminate against interstate 
commerce because there was no in-state LNG facility that would reap the benefits of the 
prohibition), rev’d on other grounds at 527 F.3d 120 (4th Cir. 2008).  
125. Norfolk S. Corp. v. Oberly, 822 F.2d 388 (3rd Cir. 1987). 
126 Id. at 391.  
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export facilities.127 But consistent with Exxon Corporation, the Third 
Circuit held that the law was not discriminatory because it did not treat 
intrastate and interstate commerce differently. In the Third Circuit’s 
words, “It is the discrimination against interstate versus intrastate 
movements of goods, rather than the ‘blockage’ of the interstate flow per 
se, that triggers heightened scrutiny review in such cases.”128 Indeed, as 
the court noted in Oberly, the Supreme Court has itself opined that a state 
may block an area of commerce completely so long as it does so 
evenhandedly.129 
 The holdings of Exxon Corporation and Oberly are not unique; for 
a law to be discriminatory in effect, it must result in a differential 
treatment of similarly-situated in-state and out-of-state actors.130 If there 
is no differential treatment — whether by accident or design — there is 
no discrimination. Applying this principle here, while the brunt of any 
decision denying the Gateway Pacific Terminal would fall largely or 
exclusively on PIT and other states that want to export their coal through 
Washington, any such decision would equally preclude an in-state 
business from building a substantially similar facility and shipping its 
coal to Washington power plants. Thus, it is highly unlikely that such 
impacts would result in a finding of discriminatory effect.  
 Similarly, the fact that denying the Gateway Pacific Terminal might 
relate to, or even focus on, impacts unique to coal (such as coal dust 
being blown from the terminal’s massive coal piles, the spilling of coal 
dust from trains entering the facility, or even climate change impacts 
                                                 
127. Id. at 401 (describing the plaintiff’s argument as being premised on the law’s effectively 
blocking the trade in coal at the state’s borders).  
128. Id. at 401.  
129. Id. See also City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626 (holding that New 
Jersey could not prohibit the import of hazardous waste originating outside the state’s borders, but 
explaining that “it may be assumed as well that New Jersey may pursue those ends by slowing the 
flow of all waste into the State’s remaining landfills, even though interstate commerce may 
incidentally be affected”). 
130. Id. See also General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278 (1997) (“[A]ny notion of 
discrimination assumes a comparison of substantially similar entities.”); Alaska v. Arctic Maid, 366 
U.S. 199 (1961) (no discrimination where state law did not favor interstate commercial fishing 
operation differently than its intrastate competitor); Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Cory, 730 
F.3d 1070, 1087 (9th Cir. 2013) (“For dormant Commerce Clause purposes, economic 
protectionism, or discrimination, ‘simply means differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state 
economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter.’”), quoting Oregon Waste 
Systems, Inc. v. Dept. of Envtl. Quality of the State of Oregon, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994); Nat’l Ass’n 
of Optometrists & Opticians LensCrafters v. Brown, 567 F.3d 521 (9th Cir. 2009) (“To determine 
whether the laws have a discriminatory effect it is necessary to compare [plaintiff] with a similarly 
situated in-state entity.”). International Dairy Foods Association v. Boggs, 622 F.3d 628 (6th Cir. 
2010) (discriminatory effect requires a showing of both (1) legislation favors local economic actors, 
and (2) burdens out-of-state economic actors). 
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resulting from the operation of coal export machinery) would not violate 
the dormant Commerce Clause. It is true that the Supreme Court has said 
that state and local governments may not discriminate against “articles” 
of interstate commerce,131 and coal is certainly an article of interstate 
commerce. But regulation of an article of commerce does not amount to 
discrimination under the dormant Commerce Clause unless it reflects 
“hostility to trade.”132 In other words, treating one article of commerce 
differently than another article is not prohibited if the disparate treatment 
“results from natural conditions.”133 Applied here, treating coal 
differently because of its unique impacts on the environment would not 
offend the dormant Commerce Clause. It is unlikely that any assessment 
of coal’s direct impacts on Washington or Whatcom County would 
amount to prohibited discrimination against the interstate movement of 
coal.  
C. Washington and Whatcom County May Consider Downstream Green-
house Gas Emissions as Part of their Local Review. 
 In addition to the direct impacts of the project, the Department of 
Ecology will also be reviewing the terminal’s climate change impacts, 
                                                 
131. City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 626. 
132. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1095 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[A] 
regulation setting its boundaries along state lines would not be considered a forbidden protectionist 
measure when its boundaries and the process setting them reflected genuine attention to the 
legitimate goals of regulation and not a mere hostility to trade.”). Indeed, state laws targeting 
specific “articles” of commerce are routinely upheld. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 
U.S. 117, 128 (1978) (upholding state law targeting retail of “gas”); Ass’n de Eleveurs de Canards et 
d’Oies du Quebec v. Harris, 729 F.3d 937, 953 (9th Cir. 2013) (upholding California law banning 
the sale of foie gras); Empacadora de Carnes de Fresnillo, S.A. de C.V. v. Curry, 476 F.3d 326, 335 
(5th Cir. 2007) (upholding ban on horsemeat); National Paint & Coatings Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 
45 F.3d at 1131 (upholding city ban on the sale of spray paint and “jumbo indelible markers”); Cotto 
Waxo Co. v. Williams, 46 F.3d 790, 794 (8th Cir. 1995) (upholding state law banning the sale of 
“petroleum-based sweeping compounds”).  
133. Cherry Hill Vineyard, LLC v. Baldacci, 505 F.3d 28 (1st Cir. 2007). See also City of 
Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 626 (holding that discrimination against interstate commerce “may not be 
accomplished by discriminating against articles of commerce coming from outside the State unless 
there is some reason, apart from their origin, to treat them differently.”) (emphasis 
added); Chemical Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 347 n. 11 (2009) (explaining that 
“hostility to the thing itself, not merely to interstate shipments of the thing,” while “an 
undiscriminating hostility is at least nondiscriminatory” under the dormant Commerce Clause); C & 
A Carbone Inc. v. Town of Klarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994) (explaining that the dormant 
Commerce Clause forbids measures that “impose commercial barriers or discriminate against an 
article of commerce by reason of its origin or destination out of State.”) (emphasis added); Oregon 
Waste Systems, Inc. v. Dep’t of Envt’l Quality of the State of Oregon, 511 U.S. 93, 101 n. 5 (2000) 
(striking down Oregon law prohibiting the importation of out-of-state waste, but explaining that “if 
out-of-state waste did impose higher costs on Oregon than instate waste, Oregon could recover the 
increased cost through a differential charge on out-of-state waste”). 
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including impacts that flow from the ultimate combustion of coal in 
Asian power plants. As we noted above, the County may also consider 
reviewing climate change impacts in association with its local review. 
The County’s zoning code authorizes the County to impose necessary 
mitigation measures or deny the project to avoid “any uncompensated 
costs” incurred by the County in responding to those impacts.134 As 
above, Montana and North Dakota have alleged that review or denial of 
the terminal on these grounds would violate the dormant Commerce 
Clause.135  
 As an initial matter, consideration of climate change impacts arising 
from coal combustion in Asian power plants would likely not render a 
decision “discriminatory” under the dormant Commerce Clause. The 
Ninth Circuit’s recent opinion in Rocky Mountain Farmers v. Corey136 is 
instructional.  
 Rocky Mountain Farmers concerned California’s Global Warming 
Solutions Act, a fuel standard regulation that established a “declining 
annual cap on the average carbon intensity of California’s transportation-
fuel market.”137 That regulation required all fuel sold in California to be 
categorized based on its carbon footprint, and the carbon footprint 
dictated how much could be sold in the state fuel market.138 At issue, 
however, was that the regulation distinguished some fuels based on their 
point of origin, assigning a higher carbon footprint to fuels produced in 
regions of the world that used “dirtier electricity or less efficient plants” 
than were used elsewhere.139 In other words, fuels otherwise 
indistinguishable from each other would be treated differently based on 
where they were produced. And that, in turn, correlated with each fuel’s 
carbon footprint under what California described as a “life-cycle 
analysis.”140   
 In upholding the regulation, the Ninth Circuit explained that the law 
was not discriminatory within the meaning of the dormant Commerce 
                                                 
134. See Whatcom County Code § 20.88.130(6); see also supra text accompanying note 86. 
135. See Letter from Rob McKenna, supra note 20, at 8 (arguing that “[a] decision to 
investigate environmental impacts in China or other importing countries, as well as in the States 
[e.g., Montana and North Dakota], is a decision that those extraterritorial impacts should play a role 
in determining whether these other States’ citizens may engage in commerce nationally and 
internationally. . . . The States believe that such actions are far outside of Washington’s borders and 
infringe on the rights of the citizens of other States and nations.”). 
136. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013), rehearing en 
banc denied at 740 F.3d 507 (9th Cir. 2014), petition for cert. filed March 20, 2014. 
137. Id. at 1080. 
138. Id. at 1080–86.  
139. Id. at 1089–90.  
140. Id. at 1089.  
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Clause. In particular, while the law treated fuels differently based on 
their point of origin, the distinction reflected an actual difference 
between the products. Moreover, the court held that in treating the fuels 
differently, California need not be confined to differences originating 
purely within the state but could, instead, consider differences stemming 
from production methods used elsewhere in the world provided that they 
had in-state ramifications.141 In the court’s words,  
Unless and until either the United States Supreme Court or Con-
gress forbids it, California is entitled to proceed on the understand-
ing that global warming is being induced by rising carbon emissions 
and attempt to change that trend. California, if it is to have any 
chance to curtail GHG emissions, must be able to consider all fac-
tors that cause those emissions when it assesses alternative fuels.142  
In other words, considering the real factors that contribute to global 
warming (even if they relate to actions taken beyond a state’s 
boundaries) is not discriminatory within the meaning of the dormant 
Commerce Clause. In many respects, this result is merely a logical 
extension of the established and longstanding rule that treating products 
differently by reason of their point of origin or destination is not 
prohibited so long as the distinction also “results from natural 
conditions.” 143 
 Applying this logic to local review of the Gateway Pacific 
Terminal, the same result should obtain. In Rocky Mountain Farmers, the 
facts making the fuel detrimental to California arose largely out-of-state. 
But that did not diminish the impact on California or prohibit it from 
differentiating between fuels on that basis.144 In the case of the Gateway 
                                                 
141. See id. at 1089 (explaining that “[i]f we ignore these real differences between ethanol 
pathways, we cannot understand whether the challenged regulation responds to genuine threats of 
harm or to the mere out-of-state status of an ethanol pathway.”).  
142. Id. at 1090 (emphasis added).  
143. Cherry Hill Vineyard, LLC v. Baldacci, 505 F.3d 28 (1st Cir. 2007). See also cases cited 
supra note 133. Moreover, a consideration of real impacts, and natural conditions relating to climate 
change, is exactly what animated the Washington Department of Ecology’s decision to subject the 
Gateway Pacific Terminal to a searching review under SEPA. See, e.g., Letter from Maia Bellon, 
supra note 8, supra, at 5 (explaining that under SEPA “the scope of environmental analysis . . . is 
determined by the specific impacts potentially associated with the specific project undergoing 
review. As a result, there is no ‘rule’ or ‘standard’ that leads to an identical scope of review for 
different projects. . . . In every case, the scope of review is determined by the extent of the proposal’s 
probable, significant, adverse environmental impacts.”). 
144. See Rocky Mountain Farmers, 730 F.3d at 1081 (explaining that “One ton of carbon 
dioxide is emitted when fuel is produced in Iowa or Brazil harms Californians as much as one 
emitted when fuel is consumed in Sacramento.”); id. at 1090 n. 8 (“‘[E]missions of well-mixed 
greenhouse gases  . . . contribute to the total greenhouse gas air pollution, and thus to the climate 
change problem, which is reasonably anticipated to endanger public health and welfare.’”) (ellipsis 
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Pacific Terminal, part of what would make the terminal harmful to 
Washington is its transport of coal to power plants that produce harmful 
greenhouse gas emissions. In this way, the two cases concern opposite 
ends in the chain of production and consumption. But just as California 
did in Rocky Mountain Farmers, Washington may “consider all factors” 
(including the real impacts — in Washington — of burning coal in Asia) 
without thereby discriminating against interstate or international trade 
within the meaning of the dormant Commerce Clause.  
D. Consideration of Downstream GHG Emissions Likely Would Not Vio-
late the Dormant Commerce Clause Prohibition on “Extraterritorial” 
State Laws. 
 However, even if state or local action does not discriminate against 
interstate commerce, it might still run afoul of another aspect of the 
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine — the prohibition on 
“extraterritorial” state regulation. Under the extraterritoriality doctrine, 
the Supreme Court has explained that a state law which “directly controls 
commerce occurring wholly outside the boundaries of a State exceeds the 
inherent limits of the enacting State’s authority,” and thereby violates the 
dormant Commerce Clause.145 In this case, proponents of the Gateway 
Pacific Terminal will undoubtedly allege that any decision reflecting 
greenhouse gas emissions in Asia will run afoul of this prohibition.  
 There are two reasons why such criticisms are likely ill-founded. 
First, the extraterritoriality doctrine has rarely been used to strike down 
state and local laws, most famously in the price-setting context when the 
law would have the practical effect of regulating commercial transactions 
that would otherwise have nothing to do with the enacting state.146 The 
doctrine has been used to strike down state environmental laws when 
they were found, in essence, to reflect a paternalistic environmental 
policy not benefiting any in-state interests. But in each case it was also 
clear that the commercial activity affected by the local law occurred 
                                                                                                             
in original), quoting EPA, Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases 
under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66496, 66499 (December 15, 2009).  
145. Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989) (emphasis added). 
146. See Healy, 491 U.S. at 145, 338–340 (striking down Connecticut law prohibiting in-state 
beer sales at prices exceeding the price in neighboring states — Court found that such a law 
attempted to “control[] the prices set for sales occurring wholly outside Connecticut’s borders, 
including prohibition on promotional and volume discounts offered in neighboring states); Brown-
Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 580 (1986) (striking down 
New York price affirmation law concerning the sale of liquor that had the practical effect of 
precluding liquor distributors from offering promotional sales in neighboring states); Baldwin v. 
G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 528 (1935) (striking down New York law concerning the local 
sale of milk that had the effect of imposing wage and sale restrictions in Vermont).   
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wholly outside the state’s boundaries, and that the negative impacts 
targeted by the law would fall outside the state’s boundaries, too.  
 For example, in the 7th Circuit case of National Solid Wastes 
Management Association v. Meyer147 the court struck down a Wisconsin 
law restricting access to in-state landfills by waste generators in 
neighboring states except on condition that the neighboring states adopt 
Wisconsin’s recycling standards.148 In effect, the Wisconsin law meant 
that if a neighboring state wanted to use Wisconsin’s landfills for any of 
its waste, it had to comply with Wisconsin law for all of its waste even if 
a substantial portion would never end up in Wisconsin. This violated the 
ban on extraterritorial state laws because it required out-of-staters to 
“adhere to the Wisconsin standards whether or not they dump their waste 
in Wisconsin.”149 Similar concerns have animated other extraterritoriality 
cases in which the state was found, in essence, to be imposing its law in a 
manner that would regulate conduct outside its borders regardless of the 
ultimate impact on in-state interests.150 
 There is a marked difference in the case of the Gateway Pacific 
Terminal and the paternalistic laws struck down in National Solid Wastes 
Management and other cases. It should be obvious that Washington 
citizens are not concerned about burning coal in Asia because it will 
cause global warming in Asia — they are concerned about global 
warming in Washington because climate change impacts originating in 
Asia are of a global nature. In this way, denying the Gateway Pacific 
Terminal would not merely be an instance of imposing local 
environmental policy on outsiders — it is a way of protecting 
Washington citizens from the real and harmful effects of burning coal 
and, in turn, of the Gateway Pacific Terminal’s role in the problem.151  
                                                 
147. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n v. Meyer, 63 F.3d 652, 658 (7th Cir. 1995). 
148. See id. at 657–58. 
149. Id. at 658.  
150. See, e.g., C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 392 (1994) 
(explaining, in dicta, that a town may not pass an ordinance intended “to steer solid waste away from 
out-of-town disposal sites that it might deem harmful to the environment.”);  Hardage v. Atkins, 619 
F.2d 871, 873, (10th Cir. 1980) (striking down Oklahoma law similar to the one in National Solid 
Wastes management Association because it would “forc[e Oklahoma’s] judgment with respect to 
hazardous wastes on its sister states”). Cf. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S 624, 642 (1982) (striking 
down Illinois “Business Take-Over Act” which attempted to regulate commercial transactions that 
“would not affect a single Illinois shareholder”).    
151. Moreover, it is notable that a significant amount of the commercial activity at issue in 
local review of the Gateway Pacific Terminal will be located in Washington (namely, export of the 
coal itself). Thus, denial of the facility would not be an illegal attempt to regulate commercial 
activity occurring “wholly” outside Washington’s borders. See Healy, 491 U.S. at 340. As the Ninth 
Circuit observed in Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, the ban on extraterritorial state laws generally 
does not extend to local laws targeting commercial transactions “‘in which at least one party is 
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 In contrast, it is likely that neither Washington nor Whatcom 
County could legally deny the Gateway Pacific Terminal based on 
mining-related impacts occurring exclusively within other states. As 
noted above, the Washington Department of Ecology has stated that it 
will review those impacts under SEPA.152 Because direct mining impacts 
likely would not affect Washington itself, denial of the project on those 
grounds would violate the dormant Commerce Clause ban on 
extraterritorial state laws. 
 Second, even if the ban on extraterritorial state laws did preclude 
the State or Whatcom County from using greenhouse gas emissions in 
Asia to outright deny the Gateway Pacific Terminal, the State and 
County could still impose mitigation measures on the terminal to offset 
those impacts. Again, Rocky Mountain Farmers Union provides an apt 
example. In that case, the Court ruled that California’s fuel standard 
regulation did not, in fact, attempt to control out of state conduct, but was 
rather a simple mechanism designed to ensure that the price of products 
sold in California would reflect the actual damage done to California by 
their carbon footprint. In essence, the regulation did not regulate out-of-
state fuel producers, but rather attempted to influence out-of-state fuel 
producers to internalize the true costs of their product.153 In the court’s 
words “States may not mandate compliance with their preferred policies 
in wholly out-of-state transactions, but they are free to regulate 
commerce and contracts within their boundaries with the goal of 
influencing the out-of-state choices of market participants.”154  
 In the case of the Gateway Pacific Terminal, mitigation measures 
intended to offset the local costs of supplying Asian power markets may 
be viewed, like the fuel standards at issue in Rocky Mountain Farmers 
Union, as a simple way of internalizing the costs of PIT’s conduct and, 
thus, as a way of influencing its out-of-state commercial decisions. At 
this point, it is unclear what such mitigation measures would look like. 
                                                                                                             
located in [the regulating state].’” Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070,1103 
(9th Cir. 2013), rehearing en banc denied at 740 F.3d 507 (9th Cir. 2014), petition for cert. filed 
March 20, 2014., quoting Gravquick A/S v. Trimble Navigation Int’l Ltc., 323 F.3d 1219, 1224 (9th 
Cir. 2003) (brackets in original). Here, in the sale of coal to Asian power plants, one of the major 
parties will obviously be located in Washington (i.e., the Gateway Pacific Terminal and  its 
owner/operators). 
152. See supra Part II.D. 
153. See Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, 730 F.3d at 1104. 
154. Id. at 1103, citing Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of America v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 679 
(2003). 
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But Whatcom County has the authority under its local code to impose 
such mitigation measures155 and they would likely be constitutional.  
 Further, should PIT view the costs as being too high to operate, that 
is a result of its own business decisions, not the dormant Commerce 
Clause. As the Supreme Court has explained, the dormant Commerce 
Clause “protects the interstate market, not particular interstate firms, 
from prohibitive or burdensome regulations.”156 The Clause does not 
protect “the particular structure or methods of operation in a retail 
market.”157 And, as a corollary, it does not guarantee that market 
participants “may compete on the terms they find most convenient.”158   
V. CONCLUSION 
 In the words of Governor Jay Inslee, whether to approve massive 
new coal export facilities is “the largest decision we will be making as a 
state from a carbon pollution standpoint.”159 In the case of the Gateway 
Pacific Terminal, that decision would result in increasing national coal 
exports by up to 40 percent;160 it could have significant environmental 
impacts on some of the State’s most significant natural resources;161 it 
will undoubtedly affect the lives of tens of thousands of Washington 
citizens; and it will do so in a market that has proven unreliable in the 
past.162 Finally, if proponents of the facility make good on their threats to 
date, any opposition to the project will likely face a substantial legal 
fight.  
 But for the reasons discussed above, and despite the recent 
comments of Montana and North Dakota, we do not believe that local 
review of the project will seriously implicate the dormant Commerce 
Clause. Indeed, Whatcom County may be in the unique and significant 
position to deny the property in its own proprietary capacity (i.e., by 
refusing to vacate Lonseth Road). The County will have wide leeway to 
review the direct impacts of the project on the local environment, and has 
the regulatory tools to do so.  And both the County and the Washington 
Department of Ecology likely may respond to global climate change 
impacts as part of their review and decision-making processes (including 
impacts stemming from the burning of coal in Asian power plants). They 
                                                 
155. See supra notes 82–89.  
156. Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 127-128 (1978). 
157. Id. at 128.  
158. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, 730 F.3d at 1092. 
159. Goad, supra note 9. 
160. See Letter from Maia Bellon, supra note 8. 
161. See Part II.A. 
162. See supra notes 10-13. 
316 Seattle Journal of Environmental Law [Vol. 4:1 
 
are entitled to proceed based on the understanding that global climate 
change is being caused by rising carbon emissions, whether those 
emissions originate within or outside the State’s border. If they are to 
take seriously their obligations to protect Washington’s coastlines and 
other natural resources, they must be free to consider all factors during 
their review of the Gateway Pacific Terminal. 
